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A man was killed in McIntosh County, Oklahoma, in August of 1999, 
kicking off nearly two decades of incorrect or incomplete judicial decisions. 
In April of 2000, Muscogee Creek citizen Patrick Dwayne Murphy was 
convicted of capital murder for this killing and sentenced to death after a 
jury trial.
1
 As of this writing, Murphy remains in the custody of the 
Oklahoma Department of Corrections.
2
 In the intervening eighteen years, 
Murphy and his attorneys have continually appealed his conviction. He 
applied twice for post-conviction relief in state court, twice for writs of 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, and twice for habeas relief in 
federal district court.
3
 In his brushes with the courts, Murphy twice acted as 
an unwitting test case. Following the United States Supreme Court’s 
landmark Atkins v. Virginia decision, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals (“OCCA”) used Murphy’s appeal for post-conviction relief to set 
forth the standard Oklahoma would apply to determine the mental capacity 
of defendants in capital cases. More recently, Murphy’s second appeal in 
federal court led to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision Murphy v. 
Royal. This case reemphasized the federal courts’ delineation of Indian 
reservation boundaries and applied that framework to the unique situation 
of Indian tribes in Oklahoma. The circuit panel held that only the federal 
government, rather than the State of Oklahoma, had jurisdiction to try 
Murphy for the murder.
4
 The Tenth Circuit then ordered the district court 
below to grant Murphy’s request for habeas relief.
5
 
The shortsightedness of Murphy v. Royal stems from the panel only 
considering jurisdiction while ignoring more substantive claims. The 
procedural posture leading to Murphy v. Royal is convoluted, but Judge 
Matheson summarized every step in his opinion for the court.
6
 The opinion 
                                                                                                             
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. Murphy v. Royal (Royal I), 866 F.3d 1164, 1173 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 2. Murphy’s continued custody in the Oklahoma Department of Corrections can be 
verified via a name search at OKLA. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS: OK OFFENDER, https:// 
okoffender.doc.ok.gov (last visited Aug. 13, 2018). 
 3. Royal I, 866 F.3d at 1173–78. 
 4. Id. at 1233. 
 5. Id. at 1178 n.16. 
 6. Id. at 1173–78. 
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illustrates the court’s understanding of the number of hours and tribunals 
previously invested in the proceedings. The federal district and circuit 
courts granted Murphy certificates of appealability—a prerequisite for 
federal circuit courts to exercise jurisdiction over an appeal—on eight 
different issues.
7
 The Tenth Circuit could have decided issues concerning 
$ prosecutorial jurisdiction; 
$ Oklahoma’s treatment of Murphy’s Atkins claim; 
$ the aggravating circumstances that contributed to a death 
sentence; 
$ the admissibility of victim-impact statements; 
$ jury instructions; 
$ procedural fumbling by the federal district court; 
$ ineffective assistance of counsel; and 
$ cumulative error.8  




The panel’s disinterest in considering Murphy’s Atkins claim is 
disappointing for many reasons. To begin, a decision from the Tenth Circuit 
regarding how Oklahoma tests for mental capacity of defendants in capital 
cases would be useful for the State and all defendants in future proceedings. 
Furthermore, the panel knew of Murphy’s numerous appeals prior to 2017, 
several of which referenced Atkins. An Atkins ruling would therefore have 
general utility while addressing a near-perennial claim of the party at hand.  
Finally, Murphy pinballed throughout the court system for eighteen years 
between his first conviction and Murphy v. Royal. His death sentence has 
neither been carried out nor commuted, and now the State of Oklahoma has 
taken its case to the Supreme Court.
10
 While Murphy’s request of habeas 
has been granted, his ordeal is far from over. The Supreme Court could 
reverse and remand on the matter of jurisdiction, returning the case to the 
Tenth Circuit to weigh Murphy’s other appeals. Given the panel’s 
knowledge of the issue and the general principles of equity and judicial 
                                                                                                             
 7. Id. at 1178 n.16. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Royal v. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 2026 (2018). 
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efficiency, the Tenth Circuit should have considered Murphy’s Atkins 
claim. 
This Note will touch on the history and jurisdictional holding of the 
Murphy v. Royal decision and will then examine Murphy’s Atkins claim and 
offer alternatives to Oklahoma’s system. Part I will address pieces of 
legislation pertinent to the procedural posture of Murphy v. Royal. Part II 
will delve into the factual and procedural background that occurred from 
1999 to 2017, which led to this case appearing before the Tenth Circuit. 
Part III will review the panel’s analysis in reaching its conclusions 
regarding jurisdiction. Part IV will examine Oklahoma’s approach to 
mental retardation and the death penalty post-Atkins. Part V will discuss the 
implications resulting from the Murphy v. Royal decision. Part VI will offer 
alternative criteria courts could rely on when determining an individual’s 
eligibility for the death penalty upon raising an Atkins challenge. 
I. Relevant Legislation 
A. Major Crimes Act 
In 1883, the United States Supreme Court held that “federal and 
territorial courts lacked jurisdiction to try an Indian for the murder of 
another Indian committed in Indian country.”
11
 Congress responded with 
the Major Crimes Act in 1885.
12
 In its current form, the Act grants the 
federal government exclusive jurisdiction over murder and other 
enumerated crimes when perpetrated by a Native American within Indian 
Country.
13
 Later additions to the Act go on to delineate the extents of Indian 
Country, namely that the term means 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding 
the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running 
through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities 
within the borders of the United States whether within the 
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether 
within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian 
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, 
including rights-of-way running through the same.
14
 
                                                                                                             
 11. Royal I, 866 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883)). 
 12. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 385. 
 13. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2018). 
 14. Id. § 1151. 
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The Major Crimes Act sets up the jurisdictional conflict resolved in 
Murphy v. Royal so many years later. A Native American man committed 
murder. If the murder occurred in Indian Country, the federal government 
had the sole authority to prosecute him for the crime. If the murder occurred 
outside of Indian Country, the State of Oklahoma had the authority to 
prosecute. Acting under the assumption that Murphy was not in Indian 
Country when he committed murder, Oklahoma prosecuted and convicted 
him. Murphy’s jurisdictional appeal to the federal government basically 
alleged that Oklahoma held Murphy in custody inappropriately. 
B. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”),
15
 
enacted in 1996, resulted in sweeping changes to existing habeas corpus 
practice in the federal courts. The primary purpose of the law was twofold. 
First, the statute intended to provide a “comprehensive approach to fighting 
terrorism both at home and abroad.”
16
 Second, the act intended to pare 
down the appeals process for capital convicts on death row.
17
 For any case 
arising out of state court, a federal judge first has to issue a certificate of 
appealability to allow a federal court of appeals to rule on the appeal’s 
merits.
18
 A court can only grant the certificate if the “applicant has made a 
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
19
 Barriers are 
further cemented in the AEDPA by prohibiting federal district courts from 
issuing writs of habeas for claims arising in state court.
20
 An exception to 




AEDPA is relevant to the Murphy decision as it presented two hurdles 
the applicant needed to overcome before the panel could proceed to the 
merits of the appeal. As a threshold matter, Murphy needed to show with 
substantiality that he had been denied a constitutional right in his state court 
proceeding. To win on a habeas claim, Murphy additionally had to prove 
that Oklahoma violated or unreasonably applied federal law. 
                                                                                                             
 15. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 
22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.) 
 16. Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 1 
PUB. PAPERS 630, 630 (Apr. 24, 1996), 1996 WL 203049. 
 17. Id. at 631. 
 18. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2018). 
 19. Id. § 2253(c)(2). 
 20. Id. § 2254(d). 
 21. Id. § 2254 (d)(1). 
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II. Factual and Procedural History 
The facts surrounding the murder in Murphy point to jealousy over a 
perceived love triangle. In 1999, Patrick Dwayne Murphy resided with 
Patsy Jacobs.
22
 Ms. Jacobs previously lived with the victim, George Jacobs, 
took his last name, and had a child with him.
23
 A few days prior to the 
events of August 28 of that year, Murphy and Ms. Jacobs argued about Mr. 




On August 28, Jacobs drank heavily with his cousin.
25
 Around 9:30 that 
night, Murphy and Jacobs traveled as passengers in separate vehicles going 
in opposite directions down a rural road in McIntosh County, Oklahoma.
26
 
At the time, Jacobs was passed out in the back of his truck while his cousin 
drove.
27
 The vehicle that Murphy was riding in turned around and followed 
the vehicle that Jacobs was in, ultimately forcing that vehicle to stop.
28
 
Murphy and two other individuals emerged from their vehicle, dragged 
Jacobs from the truck, and began beating Jacobs and his cousin.
29
 Jacobs’s 
cousin was able to flee briefly into the woods surrounding the road.
30
 
Returning a few minutes later, Jacobs’s cousin found Jacobs “barely 
breathing.”
31
 Shortly before, Jacobs’s cousin witnessed Murphy throw a 
knife into the woods.
32
 Murphy then forced Jacobs’s cousin to leave with 
him and his accomplices.
33
 A passerby happened upon the scene and left to 
phone the police.
34
 Returning a few minutes later, he found Jacobs 
breathing shallowly and observed that his genitals had been cut off and his 
neck had been slashed.
35
 Jacobs died from the resulting blood loss.
36
 The 
                                                                                                             
 22. Murphy v. State (Murphy I), 2002 OK CR 24, ¶ 2, 47 P.3d 876, 879. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. ¶ 3, 47 P.3d at 879. 
 26. Id. ¶ 4, 47 P.3d at 879. 
 27. Id. ¶ 3, 47 P.3d at 879. 
 28. Id. ¶ 5, 47 P.3d at 879. 
 29. Id. ¶¶ 5–6, 47 P.3d at 879-80. 
 30. Id. ¶ 7, 47 P.3d at 880. 
 31. Id. ¶ 9, 47 P.3d at 880. 
 32. Id. ¶ 8, 47 P.3d at 880. 
 33. Id. ¶ 10, 47 P.3d at 880. 
 34. Id. ¶ 9, 47 P.3d at 880. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. ¶¶ 9, 15, 47 P.3d at 880. 
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confrontation leading to Jacobs’s death was corroborated by Murphy’s own 
boasting to Jacobs’s cousin and to multiple other witnesses.
37
  
Murphy and his associates then tried to harm George Jacobs’s son but 
were prevented by the mother of one of Murphy’s accomplices.
38
 That 
night, Murphy admitted his actions to Patsy Jacobs.
39
 In 2000, Murphy was 
convicted for the murder of Jacobs in a jury trial.
40
 The jury then sentenced 
Murphy to death because it found the murder and castration to be 
particularly heinous.
41
 Additionally, the jury believed Murphy to be a 
continuing threat, given his threats and attempt to harm Jacobs’s minor son 
and other family members.
42
 
The OCCA heard Murphy’s direct appeal of his conviction in May of 
2002. Murphy raised arguments relating to voir dire, as well as the trial and 
sentencing stages of his trial, all of which failed to convince the court to 
reverse or remand his conviction.
43
 In September of 2002, the OCCA 
convened again and issued an opinion on Murphy’s application for post-
conviction relief. The OCCA rejected almost all of Murphy’s arguments.
44
 
However, in accordance with the recent Atkins v. Virginia decision, the 
OCCA remanded to the district court.
45
 The OCCA instructed the district 
court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Murphy could 




Murphy became the test case in Oklahoma for capital sentencing when a 
defendant claims mental retardation. The OCCA found itself in the position 
of creating state guidelines while the legislature and governor attempted to 
compromise and enact legislation concerning the issue.
47
 Murphy had been 
unable to bring this claim on direct appeal, which was decided prior to the 
Atkins ruling, despite Murphy’s request that his application be held in 
abeyance pending a decision.
48
 Murphy was uniquely positioned in a post-
conviction application for relief at the time the OCCA established rules for 
                                                                                                             
 37. Id. ¶¶ 10-11, 47 P.3d at 880. 
 38. Id. ¶ 12, 47 P.3d at 880. 
 39. Id. ¶ 13, 47 P.3d at 880. 
 40. Royal I, 866 F.3d 1164, 1173 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 41. Murphy I, 2002 OK CR 24, ¶ 1, 47 P.3d at 879. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. ¶ 64, 47 P.3d at 888. 
 44. Murphy v. State (Murphy II), 2002 OK CR 32, ¶¶ 37–38, 54 P.3d 556, 569-70. 
 45. Id. ¶¶ 37, 39, 54 P.3d at 569-70. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. ¶¶ 26-36, 54 P.3d at 566-69. 
 48. See id. ¶¶ 29-31, 54 P.3d at 567-68. 
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Oklahoma to evaluate Atkins claims.
49
 For this reason, the majority of the 
OCCA in 2005 found it appropriate to put Murphy’s Atkins claim in front 
of a jury.
50
 This decision was in spite of the district court previously finding 
Murphy’s evidence of mental retardation insufficient to warrant a trial and 
the OCCA affirming the district court’s finding in 2003.
51
 
Murphy’s post-conviction application to the OCCA in 2005 was also the 
only time any form of jurisdictional question in Murphy’s case was 
addressed in state court. Prior to the written opinion, the OCCA ordered an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether Jacobs’s murder occurred in 
Indian Country.
52
 Such a determination would preclude state jurisdiction in 
accordance with the Major Crimes Act.
53
 Both parties largely argued 
whether the crime had occurred on an Indian allotment, per the wording in 
18 U.S.C. § 1151(c).
54
 With respect to this question, the panel of judges 
holding the evidentiary hearing determined that all surface rights and 
eleven-twelfths of the mineral rights at the site of the murder had passed on 
to non-Indian owners.
55
 In its view, the remaining one-twelfth mineral 




Whether the murder occurred on an Indian reservation or in a dependent 
Indian community, however, was largely left unaddressed in the hearing. 
The OCCA considered this oversight a harmless omission based on a 
reading of Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma.
57
 It is this reading the 
Tenth Circuit ultimately found contrary to Solem v. Bartlett and the test to 
determine the extent of Indian reservations.
58
 This erroneous application by 
the OCCA opened the door for the Murphy v. Royal decision. Ultimately, 
the Tenth Circuit held the federal government had jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 1151(a) to prosecute Murphy.
59
 The location of the murder 
occurred within the limits of the Creek Nation Indian Reservation as 
                                                                                                             
 49. Murphy v. State (Murphy III), 2005 OK CR 25, ¶ 56 n.21, 124 P.3d 1198, 1208 
n.21. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. ¶¶ 11-19, 124 P.3d at 1201-02. 
 53. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2018). 
 54. Murphy III, 2005 OK CR 25, ¶¶ 10-11, 124 P.3d at 1200-01. 
 55. Id. ¶ 18, 124 P.3d at 1201-02. 
 56. Id. ¶¶ 34, 41-46, 124 P.3d at 1205, 1206-07. 
 57. Id. ¶¶ 50-52, 124 P.3d at 1207-08 (citing Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 
829 F.2d 967, 975 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
 58. Royal I, 866 F.3d 1164, 1193–94 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 59. Id. at 1233. 
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established by the federal government in 1866.
60
 And vitally, the limits of 
the reservation were never disestablished.
61
 
Meanwhile, Murphy’s Atkins appeal continued in state court. In 2009, a 
jury found that Murphy was not mentally retarded, but the verdict was 
thrown out and a new trial scheduled because of errors in the voir dire 
process.
62
 Before that new trial commenced, the district court granted 
Oklahoma’s motion to apply Murphy’s claim to the new statutory rubric 
finally enacted by the State in 2006.
63
 One provision in the law provided 
that individuals could not pursue a mental retardation claim if they scored a 
76 or greater on an intelligence quotient (“IQ”) examination.
64
 The effect of 
this statute in the instant case was that it barred Murphy from continuing his 
Atkins claim due to scores he had received on IQ tests taken during the trial 
process.
65
 In the most recent Murphy decision reached by the OCCA in 
2012, the court held that such a statutory provision did not create an ex post 
facto law or punishment.
66
 The court denied Murphy another jury trial to 




The OCCA is the court of last resort for criminal matters in the State of 
Oklahoma. Thus, the procedural history is peppered with collateral habeas 
appeals to the District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma and the 
Tenth Circuit, as well as writs of certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court. The federal district court heard two appeals prior to the Tenth Circuit 
issuing its ruling on jurisdiction. Murphy v. Sirmons in 2007 only briefly 
acknowledged the jurisdictional issue.
68
 Murphy v. Trammell in 2015 gave 
a deeper treatment to Murphy’s Atkins claim, including more recent case 
law, like Hall v. Florida.
69
 At all points in the proceedings, the named 
defendant was the warden of the state correctional facility where Murphy 
was incarcerated, but the Oklahoma Attorney General’s office argued and 
wrote on the briefs in all cases. 
                                                                                                             
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Murphy v. State (Murphy IV), 2012 OK CR 8, ¶ 3, 281 P.3d 1283, 1287. 
 63. Id. ¶ 4, 281 P.3d at 1287. 
 64. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.10b (2011). 
 65. Murphy IV, 2012 OK CR 8, ¶ 38, 281 P.3d at 1293. 
 66. Id. ¶ 46, 281 P.3d at 1294. 
 67. Id. ¶ 47, 281 P.3d at 1294. 
 68. Murphy v. Sirmons, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (E.D. Okla. 2007). 
 69. Murphy v. Trammell, No. CIV–12–191–RAW–KEW, 2015 WL 2094548 (E.D. 
Okla. May 5, 2015). 
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III. Murphy v. Royal 
The jurisdictional issue addressed by the Tenth Circuit is nuanced, yet 
straightforward in comparison to the history of the case heretofore. The 
Major Crimes Act grants the federal government jurisdiction over murder 
and certain other criminal acts perpetrated by Native Americans while in 
Indian Country.
70
 Murphy’s membership in the Muscogee Creek Nation 
was undisputed, so the issue presented was whether the location of the 
murder constituted Indian country.
71
 The panel explained this notion 
succinctly, stating:  
Congress has defined Indian country broadly to include three 
categories of areas: (a) Indian reservations, (b) dependent Indian 
communities, and (c) Indian allotments. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151. 
The reservation clause concerns us here. All land within the 
borders of an Indian reservation—regardless of whether the 
tribe, individual Indians, or non-Indians hold title to a given tract 
of land—is Indian country unless Congress has disestablished 
the reservation or diminished its borders.
72
 
Having established an Indian reservation, only Congress had the power 
to disestablish or diminish it.
73
 The standard for determining whether 
Congress disestablished or diminished a reservation has been proffered by 
the Supreme Court, and proof of disestablishment or diminishment is 
difficult to show without direct evidence of congressional intent.
74
 In short, 
Oklahoma failed to show with sufficient indirect evidence that Congress 
intended to diminish the Muscogee Creek Reservation.
75
 Despite occurring 
on land that no longer belonged to tribal members, the location of the 
murder was within the previously established and unchanged boundaries of 
the reservation.
76
 Therefore, state jurisdiction was improper.
77
 
To reach the jurisdictional question, the Tenth Circuit first had to 
determine if its jurisdiction was appropriate under the AEDPA.
78
 Normally, 
AEDPA would prohibit the federal government from granting habeas relief 
                                                                                                             
 70. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2018). 
 71. Royal I, 866 F.3d 1164, 1175 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 72. Id. at 1171. 
 73. Id. at 1172. 
 74. Id. at 1185–88. 
 75. Id. at 1205. 
 76. Id. at 1233. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1192. 
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over a state’s adjudication of a claim on its merits.
79
 But this prohibition is 
ineffective when the state’s decision is contrary to any federal laws clearly 
established by the Supreme Court.
80
 
After dispensing with the question of whether the circuit panel could 
consider the appeal, the panel could then turn to the history of the Major 
Crimes Act.
81
 This piece of legislation informed the Supreme Court’s 
understanding of Indian Country, including reservations. Notably, the Tenth 
Circuit cited to United States v. Celestine and Solem v. Bartlett for its 
understanding of the boundaries of an Indian reservation.
82
 These cases held 
that reservations were extant regardless of who owned particular parcels of 
land within the boundaries.
83
  
Finally, the circuit panel referenced Supreme Court decisions holding 
that Congress alone had the power to disestablish or diminish Indian 
reservations.
84
 This section of the opinion was broken down further, noting 
that there existed a longstanding presumption against disestablishment and 
diminishment of reservations.
85
 The court also addressed in particularity the 
fact that the act of allotment alone was insufficient evidence of Congress’s 
intent to disestablish or diminish a reservation.
86
 
Much of the remainder of the opinion dealt with the current test from 
Solem v. Bartlett for determining whether Congress intended to disestablish 
or diminish an extant Indian reservation. The three-pronged Solem test 
requires courts to first analyze the primary text of any document purporting 
to disestablish or diminish a reservation.
87
 Prongs two and three require the 
court to consider events concurrent in time with the passage of a statute, 
and to a lesser extent, those events occurring subsequent to the passage of a 
statute.
88
 Solem is a balancing test, with each prong carrying decreasing 
evidentiary weight. Additionally, ambiguities that crop up during the 




                                                                                                             
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1182-83. 
 82. Id. at 1183. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1185–88. 
 85. Id. at 1185-86. 
 86. Id. at 1186. 
 87. Id. at 1187-88. 
 88. Id. at 1188. 
 89. Id. 
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After describing the prongs of the Solem test, the Tenth Circuit applied 
the law to the facts pertinent to Murphy and Oklahoma. Solem was the law 
of the land long before the murder of Jacobs, and decisions by the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals were contrary to the Solem 
decision.
90
 These state decisions, contrary to established federal law, 
granted the Tenth Circuit jurisdiction to review Murphy’s appeal.
91
 The 
court inspected the text of several documents that the State pointed to as 
evidence that the Muscogee Creek reservation was diminished at least 
beyond the location of the murder.
92
 The panel concluded there was no 
textual language supporting the State’s position and proceeded to the 
secondary and tertiary prongs of the Solem test.
93
  
Within the second prong of the Solem test, the Tenth Circuit found 
mixed evidence that Congress intended to disestablish or diminish the 
Creek reservation, falling short of explicit statutory language.
94
 This mixed 
evidence, however, was insufficient to abrogate a reservation according to 
the test, which requires unequivocal evidence of understood congressional 
intent.
95
 Subsequent history of the land also both supported and opposed 
diminishment or disestablishment of the reservation.
96
 Such mixed evidence 
was again insufficient to overcome any presumption against diminishment 
or disestablishment.
97
 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit held that the 
Muscogee Creek Reservation encompassed the location of the murder, 
making solely federal jurisdiction appropriate for prosecutorial purposes.
98
 
IV. Atkins v. Virginia 
In 2002, the Supreme Court declared it a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment to execute individuals with mental retardation, overturning its 
previous decision from 1989.
99
 This ruling provided guidance derived from 
the American Association on Mental Retardation (now known as the 
                                                                                                             
 90. Id. at 1193–95. 
 91. Id. at 1196. 
 92. Id. at 1206-18. 
 93. Id. at 1218. 
 94. Id. at 1221. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1227. 
 97. Id. at 1228. 
 98. Id. at 1233. 
 99. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
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American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities).
100
 
However, the Court left it to states to implement the Atkins ruling within the 
framework of existing criminal justice systems.
101
 During the timeframe of 
Murphy’s appeals, two consecutive sets of criteria existed in the State of 
Oklahoma for determining the merits of defendants’ Atkins claims in capital 
cases.  
The first system was established by the OCCA during Murphy’s first 
appeal for post-conviction relief.
102
 The rubric was to be implemented only 
as a placeholder until the state legislature and governor enacted statutory 
provisions for such appeals.
103
 In fact, the OCCA claimed it based its 
procedure primarily on legislation passed by both state houses but vetoed 
by the governor.
104
 The framework established by the OCCA was 
superseded in 2006 when Oklahoma legislators passed a statute, but the 
statute was not applied to Murphy until after his jury trial in 2009.
105
 Of 
note, the section provides that  
in no event shall a defendant who has received an intelligence 
quotient of seventy-six (76) or above on any individually 
administered, scientifically recognized, standardized intelligence 
quotient test administered by a licensed psychiatrist or 
psychologist, be considered mentally retarded and, thus, shall not 
be subject to any proceedings under this section.
106
 
Due to multiple IQ test scores above this threshold, Murphy could not 
further pursue his Atkins claim in state court.
107
 
Between the denial of Murphy’s second post-conviction relief appeal 
before the OCCA in 2012 and the opinion in his second federal habeas 
appeal in 2015, the Supreme Court decided Hall v. Florida.
108
 Florida, like 
Oklahoma and other states attempting to implement Atkins, established its 
own state procedures to vet Atkins claims in capital cases.
109
 Unlike 
                                                                                                             
 100. See Use of Mental Retardation on this Website, AM. ASS’N ON INTELL. & 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/historical-context (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2018). 
 101. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317. 
 102. Murphy II, 2002 OK CR 32, ¶ 30, 54 P.3d 556, 567. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. ¶¶ 29-31, 54 P.3d at 567-68. 
 105. Murphy IV, 2012 OK CR 8, ¶ 4, 281 P.3d 1283, 1287. 
 106. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.10b (2011). 
 107. Murphy IV, 2012 OK CR 8, ¶ 38, 281 P.3d at 1293. 
 108. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). 
 109. Id. at 1992. 
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Oklahoma, Florida set a threshold bar on such claims at an IQ of 71 or 
higher, construing the Court’s advice in Atkins narrowly.
110
 Here, though, 
the Court rejected Florida’s system as unconstitutional because it did not 
allow for any measurement errors common to all forms of IQ tests.
111
 The 
Court, however, specifically declined to consider whether states that 
allowed for measurement error could constitutionally set some higher IQ 
ceiling on claims.
112
 The federal district court in Murphy v. Trammell 
considered Hall v. Florida in its ruling, but did not disturb Oklahoma’s 
statutory provision.
113
 It was well within the federal district court’s power 
to have done so, however, and it was within this panel’s discretion to 
review Hall as well as the district court’s application of the law. 
V. Implications 
The ruling in Murphy v. Royal has potentially sweeping implications. 
Construing the extent of Indian reservations broadly has particularly wide 
consequences in Oklahoma. Much of the eastern half of the state once fit 
the definition of traditional Indian Country by way of reservation, if not 
dependent community or allotment. Other defendants in capital and felony 
cases have already begun filing motions challenging state jurisdiction.
114
 
Certainly, this will be an argument that defense attorneys may raise for all 
future major crimes perpetrated by Native American individuals in Indian 
Country. This seems to be one of the concerns alluded to in the 
concurrence.
115
 Chief Judge Tymkovich implies that the Supreme Court 
might want to act specific to Oklahoma, given the unparalleled prevalence 
of Indian reservations in the state.
116
 
Beyond the Major Crimes Act, many other pieces of federal and state 
legislation may need reconsideration if originally enacted with incorrect 
assumptions about the extent of reservations. One frequent hypothetical is 
whether the entirety of Eastern Oklahoma, including the Tulsa metropolitan 
                                                                                                             
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 2001. 
 112. Id. at 1996. 
 113. Murphy v. Trammell, No. CIV–12–191–RAW–KEW, 2015 WL 2094548 (E.D. 
Okla. May 5, 2015). 
 114. See Kincaid v. Bear, No. CIV-1117-F, 2017 WL 5560424 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 8, 
2017), dismissed on other grounds. 
 115. See Murphy v. Royal (Royal II), 875 F.3d 896, 966–68 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 116. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
454 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
 
 
area, will now be more accessible for the development of Indian gaming.
117
 
Given the resources required to develop property for gaming, many tribes 
will no doubt be waiting to see how the Supreme Court rules on this 
jurisdictional issue. 
Such implications for casinos and other developments obviously do not 
impact Murphy directly as a defendant, but his position is also worth 
considering. If the decision stands, Murphy is much less likely to be 
executed simply because the jurisdiction of criminal prosecution changed 
from state to federal. Even if the federal government chooses to prosecute, 
the government has only executed three individuals since reinstating the 
federal death penalty in 1988.
118
 If federal rather than Oklahoma criminal 
law applies, a federal court may be required to determine if Oklahoma’s 
process for Atkins claims constitutionally applies in a federal case or if a 
new test must be crafted for Atkins appeals in federal cases. 
If the decision is reversed, the Tenth Circuit most likely will again have 
jurisdiction to weigh Murphy’s other issues on which it granted certificates 
of appealability. While the Murphy v. Royal decision is a victory for 
Murphy, it is not an exoneration. The decision speaks volumes to an issue 
of jurisdiction raised by Murphy in only one of his appeals. It speaks not at 
all to Atkins, which was raised in nearly all of Murphy’s appeals, nor to any 
of the remaining issues in the case. Given the possibility that the Tenth 
Circuit will again consider Murphy, the panel was derelict in its duty to 
perform justice. Through their inaction, this panel may have extended the 
circuitous path to justice and finality by several more years. 
VI. Best Atkins Practices 
Bright line rules seem a poor choice when determining an individual’s 
capacity on a spectrum. While many states may impose an IQ number 
above which a defendant cannot raise an Atkins claim, utilization of this 
practice in most jurisdictions should not be conflated with ideal practices. 
The risk is that two functionally identical individuals with very similar IQ 
scores could be treated differently by the justice system because their IQ 
scores fall on opposite sides of an arbitrary cutoff. 
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Supposing that two standard deviations on either side of the average may 
account for ninety-five percent of a population, such a test will still exclude 
one out of every twenty people. By allowing cutoff IQ scores in 
determining mental capacity in capital cases, states may not be fully 
complying with Atkins. In effect, states are saying that some margin of error 
is acceptable. Necessarily some percentage of individuals lacking the 
mental capacity to be executed will be barred from presenting evidence of 
their capacity because they scored too high on a test. 
A more constitutional metric would be to weigh IQ scores on a sliding 
scale, giving greater weight to lower scores. Individuals whose test scores 
indicate mental retardation would more easily be able to prove such 
capacity. However, individuals who scored in borderline ranges would not 
be prohibited from providing other evidence that suggests mental 
retardation. 
Additional constitutional concerns could be raised about defendants with 
average or above average IQs who still might not understand the criminality 
of their actions in narrow or specific areas. Likewise, individuals who did 
not exhibit mental retardation in their development but suffered some 
mental handicap in adulthood are not permitted to raise Atkins claims in 
Oklahoma.
119
 Oklahoma requires that evidence of mental retardation be 
exhibited and documented in an individual’s childhood or adolescence for 
an Atkins claim.
120
 In Oklahoma, age, like IQ scores, becomes an arbitrary 
cutoff preventing individuals from pursuing Atkins claims simply because 
mental retardation was first documented at eighteen instead of seventeen.  
The American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities sets criteria that courts may use to categorize and qualify 
mental retardation. However, the association is not asked to gauge the 
constitutionality of executing the mentally deficient or handicapped. A 
broader carve out would better serve the constitutional due process rights of 
individuals defending against capital cases. Ideally, IQ scores would be 
persuasive but not dispositive, and there would be no requirement for 
defendants to exhibit symptoms prior to adulthood. Perhaps such findings 
from the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities should be compared to findings from the American Psychiatric 
Association or the American Medical Association. A system that 
incorporates mental retardation criteria into a larger general category of 
                                                                                                             
 119. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.10b (2011). 
 120. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
456 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
 
 
defendants claiming incompetence to stand trial or unsuitability for the 
death penalty would be best practice. 
Conclusion 
The issue of boundaries of Indian reservations for prosecutorial purposes 
is worthwhile for federal courts to rule on, but it need not have been the 
standalone issue in Murphy v. Royal. Circuit courts have minimal impact on 
cases prior to reaching the appellate level. Once a ruling has been issued, 
courts again have little determination over future outcomes on appeal. 
When and where courts do have jurisdiction, they should use those 
opportunities to work toward justice. In Murphy v. Royal, the Tenth Circuit 
panel was well-versed in the facts leading to the appeal. The judges knew 
the case had meandered for eighteen years already. While they might only 
guess as to what will occur next, Murphy and some named Oklahoma 
official may very well appear before the Tenth Circuit again in a few years. 
Knowing this, the panel issued the narrowest possible ruling, kicking all 
other cans down the road. In so doing, and with full knowledge that some 
court may later have to determine the merits of these other seven appealable 
issues, the panel has not done justice for Oklahoma, nor for Murphy, nor for 
the surviving family of George Jacobs. 
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